Preah Vihear and Cambodia-Thai

February 1904 followed up by the Franco-Siamese Treaty of March 23^rd 1907: France and Siam sign a treaty in which Siam agrees to cede the territories of Luang Prabang on the east of the Mekong River and the land to the south of the Dangrek mountains to France in exchange for the return of Chantaburi province which the French had seized.

March 1908: France and Siam sign a follow-up treaty in which Siam agrees to cede Battambang, Siem Reap and Si Sophon to France in exchange for Dan Sai and Trat provinces, the island south of Laemsing cape, and Kud island. Yet Siam continues to exercise authority over the Preah Vihear area regulating logging and elephant hunting in the region.

1934: Thai surveyors begin mapping the boundaries of Siam. When demarcating the border with Cambodia, they place Preah Vihear in Siamese territory.

October 1940: The department of Fine Arts of Thailand officially proclaims Preah Vihear ‘a national archeological site’. The Thai government openly takes possession of the site and appoints a caretaker known as Luang Sri, who mediates in a cave near the monument.

1942: During WWII, Japan championing the Thai cause, formulates the Tokyo Treaty which officially returns Preah Vihear and other territories that Thailand was forced to cede to France.

1949: With French assistance and Cambodian consent, a complaint is lodged against Thailand over Preah Vihear. France demands that Thailand should remove all personnel from the area which France claims rightfully belongs to Cambodia.

1958: The government of Cambodia begins making overt moves to reclaim Preah Vihear. The Cambodian Ministry of Public Relations details the legal arguments over Preah Vihear and accuses Thailand of distorting historical fact, citing the 1904 treaty.

August 1958: Relations become so tense the Thai government announces a state of emergency in six areas along the Thai-Cambodian border.

December 1958: Since the two countries have failed to settle their dispute through negotiation, the Cambodian government suspends diplomatic relations with Thailand.

October 1959: The Cambodian government petitions the International Court of Justice at The Hague to command that Thailand remove its armed forces from the Preah Vihear area and affirm that Preah Vihear belongs to Cambodia.

December 1959: Thailand responds by again proclaiming Preah Vihear a national archeological site. The dispute at the International Court focuses on details of the 1904 treaty which required that a mixed commission survey the borderline. A survey was conducted by a Frenchman and a Cambodian. Thailand later claims that the map they drew was not approved by the mixed commission. Thailand argues that the border was marked by the watershed, as agreed in the 1904 treaty, and therefore Preah Vihear belongs to Thailand. The map, however, places Preah Vihear in Cambodian territory and Cambodian argues that the map had been published under the authority of the mixed commission and that 50 copies of the map had been presented to the Government of Siam and were acknowledged by the Minister of Interior.

June 1962: The International Court decides nine votes to three that Preah Vihear is located in Cambodian territory as Thailand never lodged a formal objection to the French map made according the 1904 treaty and showing Preah Vihear in Cambodian territory.

The decision in 1962, which ceded the Preah Vihear (Khao Phra Viharn in Thai language) to Cambodia shocked the Thai public.

Few issues have aroused such widespread public indignation, among even peasants and villagers, as did this decision of the court. In dealing with the popular outburst of emotion against the Cambodians, the Sarit government had to use all the power and persuasiveness at its command to keep the situation under control and to prevent dissident and subversive elements from using it to try to discredit and perhaps to upset the regime (Nuechterlein 1965:250, cited in Keyes 1991:278-9)

1970: Diplomatic relations between Thailand and Cambodia are reestablished by the Lon Nol Cambodian government and Preah Vihear is reopened to the public as a tourist destination.

1975: Khmer Rouge regime takes over Cambodia and its troops take up positions on the mountain. The area around Preah Vihear is heavily mined and the ruins become inaccessible.

August 1998: With the remnants of the Khmer Rouge army defeated, the Cambodian government reopens Preah Vihear as an international tourist site so that visitors can vies the beauty of the ruins.

10 October 2001: Prime Minister Samdech Hun Sen officially requested to the Director-General of UNESCO the inclusion of Preah Vihear and Banteay Chhmar into the World Heritage List under the 1972 UNESCO Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage.

June 23-July 2 2007: At the 31 session of the World Heritage Committee in Christchurch, New Zealand, Preah Vihear temple was nominated as world heritage site.

The State Party of Cambodia and the State Party of Thailand are in full agreement that the Sacred Site of the Temple of Preah Vihear has Outstanding Universal Value and must be inscribed on the World Heritage List as soon as possible. Accordingly, Cambodia and Thailand agree that Cambodia will propose the site for formal inscription on the World Heritage List at the 32nd session of the World Heritage Committee in 2008 with the active support of Thailand.

22 May 2008: Joint Communique between Cambodia and Thailand

July 2, 2008: At the 32nd Session of World Heritage Committee opens in Quebec, Canada, Preah Temple was officially included into the world heritage list.

July 15, 2008: Thailand sent troops to the border and in response Cambodia also sent troops to the border

At the request of Cambodia, United Nations has included the border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia in its emergency session scheduled on July 24.

Toward A New Cold War?

Conn Hallinan


Military alliances are always sold as things that produce security. In practice they tend to do the opposite. Thus, Germany formed the Triple Alliance with Italy and the Austro-Hungarian Empire to counter the enmity of France following the Franco-Prussian War. In response, France, England and Russia formed the Triple Entente. The outcome was World War I. In 1949, the U.S. and Britain led the campaign to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) a deterrent to a supposed Soviet attack on Western Europe. In response, the Soviets formed the Warsaw Pact. What the world got was not security but the Cold War, dozens of brushfire conflicts across the globe, and enough nuclear weapons to destroy the earth a dozen times over.The Cold War may be over, but you would never know it from April’s NATO meeting in Bucharest. The alliance approved membership for Croatia and Albania, and only French and German opposition prevented the Bush Administration from adding the former Soviet republics of Ukraine and Georgia. 1. George Bush and Hamid Karzai at Bucharest Nato summit“NATO,” President Bush told the gathering, “is no longer a static alliance focused on defending Europe from a Soviet tank invasion. It is now an expeditionary alliance that is sending its forces across the world to help secure a future of freedom and peace for millions.”NATO will soon begin deploying in Poland and the Czech Republic anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems that are supposedly aimed at Iran, but which the Russians charge really target them. The alliance has encircled Russia with NATO allies and bases, has added troops to the stale-mated war in Afghanistan, is preparing to open shop in the Pacific Basin, and is increasingly sidelining the United Nations.But politics is much like physics: for every reaction there is an equal and opposite reaction. In this case the most important reaction is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), an organization that embraces one quarter of the world’s population, from Eastern Europe to North Asia, from the Arctic to the vast steppes and mountain ranges of Central Asia. Formed in 2001, its members include China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Iran has observer status, although it has applied for full membership. An application by the U.S. and Japan for observer status was turned down.SCO is, in the words of a Financial Times editorial, “everything that Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger—who sought to keep Russia and China apart—tried to prevent.”According to Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, last August’s SCO meeting in the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek, “mapped out Sino-Russian ties and upgraded bilateral strategic coordination.” The two nations also agreed “to join forces to tackle other major security issues, in a concerted effort to safeguard the strategic interests of both countries.”2. Putin and Hu Jintao at Bishkek summitIt is useful to remember that it was just four decades ago that Chinese and Soviet troops clashed across the Ussuri River north of Vladivostok, and that throughout the ‘60s and the ‘70s both nations waged a savage propaganda war against one another. According to China’s People’s Daily, SCO discussions included strengthening the United Nations and “the common challenge facing the two countries, emanating out of the U.S. plans to deploy the missile-defense plans targeting Europe and the East.”China is deeply concerned about the Bush Administration’s anti- missile system, which is widely understood as targeting China, and has the capacity to cancel out Beijing’s modest Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force. Writing in the official China Daily, Fu Mengzi, vice-president of the institute of Contemporary International Relations, accused NATO of trying to tighten a “noose” around Russia, and charged that the U.S. is not as worried about terrorism as it is about “major power challenges.” Fu writes “We are watching a rekindling of the Cold War mentality in Washington’s efforts to find allies and partners while beefing up its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, East Europe and South Asia, apart from occupying Iraq indefinitely.”The Bishkek summit adopted a declaration that took direct aim at the Bush Administration’s foreign policy, including condemning “unilateralism” and “double standards,” supporting “multilateralism,” and “strict observance of international law,” and underlining the importance of the UN.Is SCO evolving into a political alliance with a strong military dimension, like NATO? Not yet, but its member states carried out joint “anti-terrorist” maneuvers in Russia and China last August, and the organization is closely tied to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).3. The first joint exercise, 2007CSTO, established in 2002, includes Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. It is a traditional military alliance whose members have pledged to come to one another’s support in case of an attack. It is currently developing a rapid-reaction force similar to the one being built by NATO.CSTO has offered to cooperate with NATO, but so far the western alliance seems uninterested, preferring, instead, to deal with CTSO member nations on a bilateral basis. The refusal of NATO to treat CTSO as a regional force has sparked some anger and a good deal of suspicion. NATO has a policy, according to CTSO General Secretary Nikolai Bordyuzha, of “projecting and consolidating its military-political presence in the Caucasus and Central Asia.” It is a policy, said the CTSO leader, which could destabilize the region.M.K. Bhadrakumar, a former career diplomat who served as India’s ambassador to Uzbekistan, says that that the SCO and CSTO may eventually merge. “The SCO may focus on the range of so-called ‘new threats’ [terrorism] rather than on the conventional form of military threats, while CSTO would maintain a common air-defense system, training of military personnel, arms procurement, etc.”In the same week that SCO met in Bishkek, the Russians announced their response to NATO’s ABM system: a resumption of strategic air patrols, improving Moscow’s anti-missile system, modernizing the Topol-M ICBM, and constructing new missile firing submarines.To counter SCO’s growing influence—the organization now has official observer status at the UN, and a working relationship with the Association of South East Asian Nations—the U.S. launched a “Great Central Asia” strategy to try and drive a wedge between Central Asian nations and Russia, and to woo India by playing on New Delhi’s apprehension of China’s growing power.But, according to Bhadrakumar, the Central Asian part of the U.S. strategy is not likely to be very successful, with the possible exception of Turkmenistan. With the U.S. deeply mired in Iraq and Afghanistan, he says, “U.S. stock is very low” in the region. Washington appears to have had more success with India, but New Delhi is clearly of two minds about SCO. On one hand, many Indians are nervous about the growing power of China. On the other, India desperately needs the energy resources of Central Asia.India will probably try to chart a middle course, keeping itself free of political alliances, but making sure it doesn’t do anything that might disrupt the flow of gas and oil to its growing industries. For instance, New Delhi sharply rejected the Bush Administration’s efforts to halt a pipeline deal between India and Iran. Whether SCO will turn into an eastern NATO is by no means clear, but the economic side of the alliance is solidly grounded in self-interest pivoting on oil and other natural resources.NATO, on the other hand, is an alliance in trouble. While the organization has agreed to help bail the U.S. out of the Afghan quagmire, many member nations are hardly enthusiastic about the war. At the April meeting the U.S. plea for more troops turned up 700 French soldiers. As Anatol Lieven, a professor of War Studies at King’s College London, points out, this comes to one for every 400 square miles of Afghanistan. NATO also agreed to supply 18 new helicopters, “a fraction of the numbers it takes to ferry millionaires to their European ski resorts on any given day,” says Lieven.NATO did back the ABM deployment, but no one besides Washington is breaking out the champagne. Some 70 percent of the Czech public opposes it, and the Poles are using the issue to blackmail the U.S. into modernizing its military. With the Poles suddenly playing hard to get, Washington has opened talks with Lithuania as a possible back-up site for the ABMs. The Russians—already unhappy about the missiles and the attempt to recruit Georgia and Ukraine into NATO—would react furiously to an ABM system literally in their front yard. The Lithuania proposal has made many Europeans uncomfortable as well. “The last thing we need is another conflict with Russia,” Gereon Schuch, a program director at the German Council for Foreign Affairs told the New York Times.In spite of NATO backing the ABM deployment, many are hardly enthusiastic. As one NATO official cynically remarked to Financial Times columnist Gideon Rachman, the ABM is “a system that won’t work, against a threat that doesn’t exist, paid for by money we don’t have.”The U.S. ABM program has run up a bill of over $100 billion and, according to a recent Government Accounting Office report, it hasn’t been successfully tested with “sufficient realism.”Translation: the tests are rigged.If NATO falls apart, and the SCO never develops into a military alliance, history suggests that we will probably all be better off. Military alliances have a way of making people miscalculate, and miscalculating in a world filled with nuclear weapons is a dangerously bad idea.Conn Hallinan, a columnist for Foreign Policy In Focus, is the former director of the UC Santa Cruz journalism program and a UCSC college provost. This is a revised and expanded version of an article that appeared at Foreign Policy in Focus on June, 19, 2008. It is posted at Japan Focus on June 23, 2008.