India-China closer relations

Russia-China Relations Cool. Implications for the Asia Pacific

M K Bhadrakumar

Whatever can be said about who’s up and who’s down at any particular point in time in Asian great power politics, one immutable fact is that three major powers – Russia, China and Japan – are geographic neighbors. Living in proximity in a region with a long history of warfare and protracted struggles over resources, the three countries have powerful incentives to negotiate energy, trade and arms limitation agreements and establish conditions conducive to a peaceful and prosperous co-existence.But what of the United States, the Asia-Pacific’s fourth and strongest power both as the dominant military force in the region and as a major economic player? The US is now laying claim not only to recognition of its strength in the region, it is also insisting on its geographic place at the table in Asia-Pacific affairs. Speaking before a pan-Asian gathering of senior security officials in Singapore on May 31, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates informed his audience that the US is a “resident power” in Asia. “By that term I mean there is sovereign American territory in the western Pacific, from the Aleutian Islands all the way down to Guam,” he explained.As he tells it, “America’s status in Asia rests on long-standing interests and deeply held notions about the basic character of the United States. Projecting outward from our Pacific coastline, the U.S. has had a cultural, economic, educational, geographic, historical, and political presence in Asia since the 19th century,” alluding presumably to the colonial conquest of the Philippines as the foundation for its subsequent advance.Gates also gives his listeners some neighborly advice: as the US view of security in the region is one that leaves “little room for a separate ‘East Asian’ order,” the only real option is acceptance of a framework of common cooperation guided by Washington.In Guam, the US has made clear the lengths it is ready to go to realize its Asia security dreams. According to the May 30 International Herald Tribune, the US military intends to bulldoze any “remaining jungle” in Guam to make way for vast new basing facilities that will house some forces presently based in Okinawa. At the same time, China and Russia face an expansive US-Japan security relationship that extends throughout the Pacific to the Middle East and Central Asia.This is by way of introduction to M K Bhadrakumar's analysis of recent conflicts, or at least cooling, in Russia-China relations in the areas of energy cooperation and arms trading that this former diplomat in India’s Foreign Service believes “have undoubtedly introduced an element of chill into bilateral ties.” These two countries recently issued a joint declaration that opposes US missile defense, advocates peaceful diplomacy with Iran and supports an expansion of Russian civilian nuclear technology trade to China. Now the US is invoking island possessions, national character and history to claim and justify an authentic Asian identity. If the Asia Pacific becomes more politically and militarily contested, will this lead to strengthened Russia-China bonds? Possibly, but as described by Bhadrakumar some significant bilateral differences apparently need to be addressed first. John McGlynnKremlinology is back in vogue. Experts and analysts have come out of the woodwork to run a fine-tooth comb through Kremlin events, searching for clues on the direction of Russian policies under new President Dmitry Medvedev.Often in the Soviet era, during feverish over-analyses by foreign experts, the obvious would get elbowed out in favor of tantalizing interpretations over men and mice. Could history be repeating itself?Much has been made of Medvedev's choice of Kazakhstan and China as his first destinations after assuming office from Vladimir Putin on May 7. Was it a deliberate signal to Western capitals? Moscow pooh-poohed the suggestion. A prominent Moscow commentator pointed out, "It would be best to go to the East and West at the same time, but that is impossible."But the disarming explanation overlooked the fact that Medvedev after all did make a choice in traveling to Beijing via Astana last weekend. Eight years ago, in 2000, when Putin went abroad as Russia's president for the first time, he travelled to London via Belarus. At that time, Moscow let it be known there was rich symbolism in Putin's choice, which was intended to convey that Russia wanted closer ties to the West.
Medvedev and Hu Jintao
Equally, in May 2003, Chinese President Hu Jintao's first foreign visit took him to Moscow. The government-owned China Daily newspaper aptly commented on the day of Medvedev's arrival in Beijing on Friday: "The first foreign trip of any head of state should be a carefully calculated move. The country he or she visits is supposed to be important to his or her own country's foreign relations. Little wonder that Medvedev's two-day China visit has generated much interest ... Clearly, new leaders of the two countries have put their bilateral relations on top of their foreign policy agenda."Pragmatic cooperationThe Chinese comment stated the obvious to emphasize the bilateral content of Medvedev's visit. In fact, Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Li Hui told the media at a briefing that Medvedev's visit would have four "goals": one, to establish a "working relationship and personal friendship" at the leadership level; two, to oversee the fulfillment of bilateral cooperation in practical terms; three, to increase political trust and extend mutual support on "issues concerning sovereignty, security and territorial integrity"; and, four, to deepen "pragmatic cooperation".The fourth "goal" - pragmatic cooperation - captures the quintessence of the so-called strategic partnership between the two countries. China would have no difficulty to know that Russia has been and will remain essentially Western-centric (as distinct from "pro-West"). Over two-thirds of Russia's population live in its European part and the locus of economic and political power lies there.But that does not detract from Russia's abiding interest in China, which is natural and historical as a neighboring country, and combines pragmatically in the present day with the imperatives of China's phenomenal rise. At the same time, Russia realizes that it is only one among many big players seriously engaging China and cannot hope to claim a privileged partnership with it.No sooner had Medvedev concluded his two-day China visit on Saturday, South Korea's newly elected "pro-American" President Lee Myung-bak arrived in Beijing on a four-day trip. China followed the United States and Japan in Lee's itinerary. South Korea's trade volume with China is four times that of Russia's.A free trade agreement between the two countries is under negotiation. China hopes to collaborate with South Korea in finessing a regional security mechanism for the Asia-Pacific region. Similarly, by Monday, Moscow's attention had already began drifting westerly toward Brussels, where European Union (EU) foreign ministers finally announced plans to commence negotiations with Russia over a new strategic partnership and cooperation agreement.The talks are expected to begin at the EU-Russia summit meeting in the town of Khanty-Mansiysk in Russia's Siberia on June 26-27. Moscow is keenly listening to the new voice of realism ringing in Brussels, with both Old and New Europe alike advocating a new partnership with Russia. As noted Russia hand Jonathan Steele of the Guardian newspaper of London wrote, "The reality is that interaction between Russia and the EU is bound to develop in all these areas, however they are labeled."Frictions in cooperationMoscow would have reason to worry that frictions have appeared in two areas of its ties with China, which are critical to sustaining the momentum and verve of the strategic partnership. First is the energy relationship. The implementation of the multi-billion contracts signed in 2006 for Russian energy supplies to China has run into difficulty. Russia's Rosneft oil company is threatening to terminate the contract unless China agrees on a price increase.This may also complicate the signing of a new agreement for the supply of 50 million tons of Russian oil to China in 2010-2015. In turn, this puts a question mark on the efficacy of the Chinese branch to the East-Siberia Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline, which Russia is constructing. In an interview with Chinese journalists in Beijing prior to his departure for Moscow, Medvedev said Russia and China have reached a "basic agreement" on the ESPO and that the negotiations on oil price are "nearly complete". Expressing willingness to set up new oil refineries in China, he said natural gas cooperation with China is also "under discussion". But there was no concrete outcome during the visit.The root of the problem in energy cooperation lies in Russia's focus on expanding its European market, which is where the money lies. Unlike the Europeans, China constantly seeks discount prices. Also, Russia's deposits are mostly in western Siberia, which is closer to Europe than China. The existing pipeline system is also orientated heavily toward supplying the European market. Russia's priority lies in buying downstream assets in Europe. All in all, China is quite a long way from becoming an alternative market for Russian energy exports, which in turn acts as a disincentive on Russia committing investments on projects geared for China. Medvedev mentioned in China that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) should develop "new directions of cooperation" in the field of energy. China and Russia are the lead nations in the SCO, which also includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.The second fault line in Russia-China cooperation concerns military cooperation. The stark reality is that the Russia-China bilateral commission on military cooperation hasn't even had a meeting during the past two years. Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov's visit to China has been repeatedly postponed. At present, Russian companies have nothing on their order book from China. Simply put, China has stopped buying weapons from Russia.Post-Soviet Russia supplied more than 90% of China's imports of weapons and China accounted for 39% of all Russian exports. In 2007, China was the single-biggest recipient of Russian weapons. Yet, as of today, there are no outstanding Chinese orders with Russia for big-ticket items. It seems China is signaling its displeasure. The point is that for a variety of reasons, Russia is reluctant to supply China with state-of-the-art weapons systems such as rocket-launched flame-throwers, long-range bombers, nuclear-powered submarines, etc. China would have noted that Russia has no such misgivings about supplying sophisticated weapons systems to India.
In 2005 China purchased Russian IL-76s and IL-78s
A Russian commentator argued, "Such [Russian] caution is not pleasant for China, which has suggested that Russia think about the future of bilateral military technical cooperation. Bilateral military ties would have been rolled back to zero very quickly, if not for a European ban on the supply of weapons and combat control systems to China."Curiously, Russia doesn't seem to be unduly perturbed by this decline in deliveries and orders. Arguably, Russia has already begun securing orders from other countries to make up for the "loss" of the Chinese market. The head of Russia's Federal Service for Military and Technical cooperation, Mikhail Dmitriev, was on record last December that Russia had secured orders worth US$32 billion from several countries, including new markets such as Algeria, Indonesia and Venezuela. There are no clear indications of Medvedev's talks in Beijing having resolved the differences impeding Russia-China military cooperation.Russia woos China By far the most impressive outcome of Medvedev's visit to China concerns a nuclear agreement. Russia secured contracts in excess of $1.5 billion. This includes the construction of two VVER (Vodo-Vodyanoi Energetichesky Reactor) 1,000 reactors and a gas centrifuge plant in China, apart from Russia providing uranium-enrichment services and implementing a high-capacity fast-breeder reactor.Significantly, Russia agreed to share with China for the first time the high technology behind gas centrifuges produced in secrecy at the Kovrov mechanical plant in the Vladimir region. The contract provides for Russia supplying 6 million SWUs (separation work units) of low-enriched uranium to China, which is very substantial quantity. (The entire uranium-enrichment capacities in the world amount to 36 million SWUs currently.)Medvedev's visit to China underscores Russia's wooing of China. Moscow extended a strong show of support to China in countering Western pressure on Tibet. Moscow has generously come to the aid of earthquake victims in China. Against the backdrop of the growing chill in Russia's ties with the West, Moscow estimates the need to strengthen its strategic understanding with Beijing. The joint statement issued after Medvedev's visit strongly affirms a common position between the two countries regarding the US's missile defense system, the US's pressure tactics on human rights and related issues, the problem over Iran's nuclear program, the militarization of outer space, etc. In a speech at Beijing University, Medvedev said, "Russian-Chinese cooperation is now becoming a key factor in international security - a factor without which it would be impossible to take fundamental decisions through international cooperation."All the same, the fact remains that the normative convergence in the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership aims at achieving certain specific objectives and shared interests and is not about values. Attention now turns to the annual meeting of the SCO in August in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.So far so good. But the massive imbalance in bilateral trade (Russia increasingly supplying raw materials and China exporting engineering products); the drop in Russian military sales; and the impasse in energy cooperation - these negative developments have undoubtedly introduced an element of chill in bilateral ties. As the political commentator of Russia's Novosti news agency put it rather sardonically, "It is difficult to understand what to do next - invest more in each other's economies, continue cooperation in space (we have programs to develop the moon, Mars and Phobos), make movies together, or translate more books? Shall we do all of that at the same time?"M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for over 29 years, with postings including India's ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001).

Retrieved from Japan Focus at http://www.japanfocus.org/_M_K_Bhadrakumar-Russia_China_Relations_Cool__Implications_for_the_Asia_Pacific

Japan China and Africa

Japan Seeks to Outbid China in Quest for African Support Ramesh Jaura and Kawakami OsamuTwo reports follow on the vast, and vastly expensive, Tokyo International Conference on African Development designed to showcase Japan’s aid to Africa. The conference, held in Yokohama with the presence of 51 of 53 African nations, was attended by 40 Presidents of African nations. The first report by Ramesh Jaura concentrates on the proposed Japanese aid package, as Japan proposes to double both trade and investment in Africa within five years. The second report by the Yomiuri Shimbun's Kawakami Osamu highlights the real stakes for Japan: the effort to outbid China whose burgeoning trade, investment and presence in Africa is a cause of Japanese, and the continued pursuit of the chimera of a Japanese UN security council seat. Neither report mentions either oil and energy or military strategic issues. MSJapan To Double Aid to Africa by 2012Ramesh JauraAfrican leaders are in Japan seeking an increase in official development assistance (ODA) and a boost to trade and investment.


In a keynote address at a three-day conference that kicked off on Tuesday in Japan's port city of Yokohama, Tanzania's President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete welcomed the announcement by Japan's Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo to double Japan's ODA in the next five years, bringing annual aid from the current US$900 million to $1.8 billion by 2012.But, he added: "Africa needs more ODA to develop its infrastructure, develop its human capital, and improve the provision of basic social and economic services."
Pres. Kikwete and Prime Minister Fukuda
Kikwete was addressing the fourth round of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). Speaking on behalf of 52 African governments, the Tanzanian President said: "Besides the increase in ODA, which is highly appreciated, TICAD needs to go further."He said there was a need for increased trade between Africa and Japan, more Japanese investment, and "more involvement and active presence and participation of the Japanese private sector on the continent."Kikwete and other African heads of state also welcomed a Japanese package that includes up to US$4 billion of soft loans to Africa over the next five years to help improve infrastructure, and the doubling of grant aid and technical cooperation for the region over the next five years, bringing the five-year average to $1.4 billion from $700 million at present.But they stressed the need to take into account all countries on the African continent, and not focus the measures on South Africa and Egypt, which absorb 85% of Japanese investment in Africa."We must attach importance to the local potentialities of the African countries - particularly in the face of the current food crisis," Ohata Akihiro, a senior leader of the New Komei Party that is part of the ruling coalition government in Japan led by the Liberal Democratic Party told IPS. Ohata pleaded for exploring needs for technology and aid, keeping in view concerns about the environment and human rights.Contradicting reports in some newspapers that along with China and India, Japan was joining the run for Africa's rich resources, External Affairs Ministry spokesman Kodama Kazuo said Japan was keeping up a high-level policy dialogue with African leaders and development partners that it had launched at the first round of TICAD in 1993 - when "aid fatigue" had set in after the end of the Cold War.Kodama told IPS that the process continued with TICAD II in 1998 and TICAD III in 2003, and has evolved into a major global framework to facilitate initiatives for African development."The [present] conference comes at a time when Africa's average economic growth rate has reached 6%, peace-building and democratization are taking hold, and countries are tackling climate change and environmental concerns," Kodama said.This view is supported by a World Bank study released ahead of the conference. According to the study, sub-Saharan Africa is reversing its two-decade decline in economic and social development. That is reason enough for the organizers to give a forward-looking title to the conference, "Towards a vibrant Africa: A continent of hope and opportunity".Fukuda said Tuesday: "If we were to liken the history of African development to a volume of literature, then what we are about to do now is open to a new page, titled the 'century of African growth'. In the future, Africa will become a powerful engine driving the growth of the world."The conference, TICAD IV, is being attended by leaders from 52 African countries including some 40 heads of state and government, 22 donor nations along with the European Union (EU), 12 Asian countries, and officials from 16 African regional organizations and 55 international organizations.The conference has three priorities: boosting economic growth; ensuring human security, including the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, and consolidation of peace and democratization; and addressing environmental issues and climate change.The conference is co-organized by the United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the World Bank.The results of TICAD IV will be fed into the G8 summit in Hokkaido in Japan, scheduled to begin July 7. "We want to bring African priorities to the summit of the world's major industrial nations," Kodama said.Foreign Ministry spokesman Kodama said TICAD IV will conclude with the adoption of the "Yokohama Declaration" outlining guiding principles and approaches to African development among TICAD stakeholders, as well as a "Yokohama Action Plan" and a "Yokohama Follow-up Mechanism" laying out a road map for action-oriented initiatives with measurable targets.This article was published by Inter Press Service on May 29, 2008.China Rivalry Behind Japan's Bid for African support at TICAD IVKawakami OsamuThe government believes it has built a concrete diplomatic footing with African countries at the Fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD IV), which closed Friday. However, it is unclear if TICAD IV will lead to African support for Japan's bid to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. Fifty-one of 53 African nations took part in TICAD IV. Of the 51 participating nations, 40 sent their presidents, vice presidents or premiers.A senior Foreign Ministry official said: "TICAD IV became one of the biggest international conferences ever held by the Japanese government. I feel that trust between African countries' and Japan has crystallized."Japan's hosting of the conference has fueled its rivalry with China over Africa. China has been economically penetrating African countries for natural resources, and in 2006, it held the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing. Thirty-five heads of state from African countries took part in the forum.
Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and President Thabo Mbeki in South Africa in 2006
Government officials are pleased by the number of leaders that participated in TICAD IV. "TICAD's participation figures are comparable to FOCAC's," one official said.At the conference, the Japanese government announced assistance measures for African countries. One measure was a promise to double Japan's official development assistance in the next five years. This included providing a loan of up to 4 billion dollars in yen.At a Thursday meeting on escalating grain prices, Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo said: "Japan promised to provide assistance measures to Africa. These measures include supporting food production expansion and improving agricultural productivity. We're prepared to make further contributions."China's total trade with African countries came to 73.5 billion dollars in 2007. Total trade between Japan and Africa was 26.6 billion dollars in 2007. "This conference has been assisting African countries since 1993. As this year's host, we wanted to be more competitive than China," a government official said.
China-Africa summit 2006
Increasing government loans to Africa aims to support African countries' development of infrastructure such as roads. In turn, it will be easier for domestic companies to expand investments there. However, some experts point out that the 4 billion dollars loan looks bigger than it actually is because previous debt repaid by countries will be deducted from the amount of the new loans. Thus, the net amount the countries will receive is expected to be less than 4 billion dollars.There were instances when the conference did not go as Japan expected. The government planned to include a statement in the Yokohama Declaration to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 50 percent from current levels by 2050. However, the government withdrew this provision after encountering fierce opposition from South Africa, a major polluter.Fukuda held bilateral talks with 40 leaders of African countries and seven private sector Africa supporters. At the meeting, Fukuda asked for support of U.N. Security Council reform and Japan's bid to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. The government hopes to gather momentum for Security Council reform through support from African countries, which hold about 25 percent of U.N. General Assembly seats.Fukuda met with 47 people during the summit and saw varying responses. John Kufuor, president of Ghana, was a strong supporter. "We will support Japan becoming a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council," he said. However, some countries were not as positive. Namibian President Hifikepunye Pohamba said, "I will take the issue back to my country and examine it."A government official said: "Most participating countries showed understanding or support on the [United Nations] issue. However, only a few countries went beyond their past stances and expressed their support for our bid." "Algeria, Egypt, Libya said they won't approve the Security Council reform if they can't become a permanent member themselves. I'm worried some countries are showing superficial support for Japan while in their hearts they are less than supportive," he added.Kawakami Osamu is a staff writer for The Yomiuri Shimbun.

This article was published in The Yomiuri Shimbun on May 31, 2008.

Retrieved from Japan Focus at http://japanfocus.org/products/details/2768

AHRC-STM-157-2008June 5, 2008

A Statement by the Asian Human Rights Commission

CAMBODIA: Ban on election campaign references to the monarchy is unconstitutional
Cambodia is making preparations for the general election to be held on 27 July 2008. Yet, well before the start of the official campaign period, which is due on 27 June, the 11 registered parties have already been busy.
As in previous elections, the ruling Cambodian People’s Party or CPP is exploiting all the advantages it has to garner popular support, while the other parties are facing threats, intimidation, assassinations, and restrictions in one form of another. According a group of civil society organizations, during the period of January 2008 -- May 2008, there were five cases of political killings, 21 cases of harassment of and threat against party activists and 15 cases of dismantling of party banner signs.
On the 2nd June, Prime Minister Hun Sen made a public appeal to the king of Cambodia to issue a message "to prohibit political parties from using the monarchy as their own possession" in their campaign to garner votes. He said that the National Election Committee or NEC would prepare a letter of request to the monarch to issue the message he wanted. He also said that NEC had already issued such a ban to political parties, but that they had not heeded them, the last resort, therefore, was the king himself. It is generally accepted that that the recalcitrant party Hun Sen was alluding to was the one led by Prince Norodom Ranariddh and which is widely known as the royalist party.
Ranariddh used to lead the royalist FUNCINPEC party founded by his father, retired King Sihanouk. He and his FUNCINPEC party had been in a coalition government with Hun Sen and his CCP until Ranariddh’s ousting from FUNCINPEC's presidency in 2006. While FUNCINPEC continued its coalition with CPP, Ranariddh formed a new, self-named party, the Norodom Ranariddh Party or NRP in 2007. Before his ousting, Ranariddh had become Hun Sen’s arch enemy.
Ranariddh is now living in exile in Malaysia. In 2007, following a criminal lawsuit by his former party; he was sentenced to prison for breach of trust in the management of FUNCINPEC's assets. Though his appeal against his sentence is pending at the Supreme Court, Ranariddh would, according to Hun Sen’s recent statement, be "handcuffed and sent to prison" if he ever retuned to Cambodia.
Hun Sen envisaged the defeat of the "royalist party", meaning the NRP, by "sons of commoners", meaning Hun Sen and his own CPP, in the forthcoming election. He said that the royalist party had used the campaign slogan, "If you love the King Father (Sihanouk), vote for me (Ranariddh)", but it had, nonetheless, been defeated many times in the past. Without naming him or his party, Hun Sen said that Ranariddh was using King Sihanouk’s name all the way, and the use of the name and the repeated defeats were harmful to the monarchy. In his call on the reigning king, who is also Sihanouk’s son, Hun Sen said "we want to protect the monarchy, but he destroys it". This is the reason behind his appeal to the king to issue the concerned ban.
NEC has already issued such a ban. For the forthcoming election, it has issued a Code of Conduct for Political Parties, Candidates, and Political Party’s Agents during the Election of the National Assembly Members, July 27, 2008. This Code of Conduct was launched at a meeting with political parties held on the 6th May. The next day a leading Khmer-language newspaper, Koh Santepheap, reported on that meeting under the headline “Prohibition Governing the Election Campaign: End of Road for Self- Proclaimed Royalist Parties”.
This newspaper wrote, among other things, that "according to this law (code), it is prohibited to use photos, speeches, messages, achievements and names of the king, the great and valorous king (retired King Sihanouk) and the great queen mother (Sihanouk’s wife and the reigning king’s mother).... during the election campaign".
The ban on campaign references to the monarchs as reported by that newspaper is wider than the prohibition provided for in NEC’s Regulations and Procedures for election of members of the National Assembly dated the 28th May 2003. Point 7.13.11 of these Regulations and Procedures say that “Any propaganda activity using photos, royal speech, messages, achievements or the name of His Majesty the King or the logo of the NEC in order to gain votes shall be prohibited.”
The same reported ban is also wider than Prohibition No. 22 under Section IV on “Prohibitions for the Political Parties, Candidates, and Political Party’s Agents” of the Code of Conduct. This Prohibition No. 22 says that “The political parties, candidates, political party’s agents, and supporters must not use during the campaign, the (reigning) king’s photo or name, or the name of the great and valorous king (Sihanouk), or NEC logo to gain voters’ support.”
By virtue of Article 73 of the Law on the Election of Members of the National Assembly of 1997 as subsequently amended, NEC is habilitated to adopt a code of conduct, and all political parties and candidates, members and supporters of political parties must comply with this code and the rules, regulations, procedures and principles set out in this law. However, neither this law, nor any other law, nor the Constitution of Cambodia itself has laid down any principle for or has specifically stipulated such a ban on campaign references to the monarchy as adopted by NEC respectively in its 2003 Rules and Procedures and in its 2008 Code of Conduct, or as Koh Santepheap newspaper has reported.
Only the Political Party Law of 1997 has prohibited the use of symbols related to the monarchy as a symbol or logo of a political party under its Article 11, paragraph 3 which says that “symbol/logo of a political party shall not be copied or taken from a national symbol or picture representing religion, Angkor Wat temple or photos or pictures of all Khmer (Cambodian) kings.” However, this ban has nothing to do with the election campaign.
The ban as stipulated in NEC’s 2003 Regulations and Procedures or its 2008 Code of Conduct, or as reported in Koh Santepheap newspaper, or as might be issued by the Cambodian reigning king upon Prime Minister Hun Sen’s appeal, is therefore ultra vires, and violates the Cambodian people’s constitutional right to freedom of expression.
When this prohibition is meant for a political party, that is, the royalist Nororom Ranariddh Party, as Prime Minister Hun Sen and Koh Santepheap newspaper’s headline have alluded to, it is discriminatory and violates the principle of legal generality. Furthermore, it violates Article 76 of the Constitution of Cambodia on the holding of free and fair elections of Members of the Parliament which says: “The deputies shall be elected by a free, universal, equal, direct suffrage and secret ballot.”
More importantly, the king of Cambodia would greatly compromise his integrity and moral authority, should he heed his prime minister’s appeal and issue any message prohibiting the use of campaign references to the monarchy as detailed above. He would violate the Constitution and laws of his country which he has taken oath to obey as spelled out in Annex 4 to the Constitution. He would also fail in his constitutional duty to protect the rights and freedoms of the Cambodian people as stipulated in Article 8 of the same Constitution.
Therefore the National Election Committee should remove the ban on campaign references to the monarchy from its 2003 Regulations and Procedures and 2008 Code of Conduct. For his part, Prime Minister Hun Sen should desist from imposing this ban and retract his appeal to the king to issue it.
# # #
About AHRC: The Asian Human Rights Commission is a regional non-governmental organisation monitoring and lobbying human rights issues in Asia. The Hong Kong-based group was founded in 1984.

leadership and water management in cambodia

Assassination Threats Couldn’t Stop Cambodian Official in Providing Safe Drinking Water To The Poor

By Puy Kea

Phnom Penh , 10 Oct: A Cambodian public official has weathered assassination threats and a slow moving bureaucracy in a war-torn country - where most of its infrastructures were destroyed - to create one of the most trusted and safest water supplies in the region, particularly, the service provided to the poor in an overwhelming crowded capital.

“It was bureaucratic and it was full of incompetence staffers,” recalled Ek Sonn Chan, director of Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority (PPWSA), who has been working with the public utility since October 1993. “I fired many staff and my friends told me that I would be assassinated”.

Today, not only he has survived, but he has transformed PPWSA into a model public water utility in Asia , for which he has been awarded the 2006 Ramon Magsaysay Award – the Asian equivalent of the Nobel prize – and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has hailed him as a “water champion”.

PPWSA is different because it has achieved efficiency, greater water productivity and increasing consumer base by radically transforming a decrepit and war-torn water supply system with missing water and missing customers into a model public sector water utility that provides 24-hour safe drinking water to Phnom Penh .

Under Ek Sonn Chan’s leadership, the PPWSA now provides 90 percent of water coverage to some 1.4 million Phnom Penh residents and people living in the outskirts of the city.

“My dream in the government service is that I want to produce water for people across the country to receive enough water with high quality,” the 57 year-old Chan said in an interview given at his modest government office.

During the Khmer Rouge regime, from 1975 to 1979, the water supply was out of operation and many of its production, distribution facilities and equipment were destroyed, while many of its qualified personals were also killed.

When Chan joined PPWSA in 1993, they were supplying water to 40 percent of the city area and serving merely 20 percent of the total population. At best, water supply was intermittent and only available for 10 hours a day.

As Phnom Penh resident in Chamkarmon District, Ly Korm, remembers: “Now I have sufficient water to use. In 1993 I didn’t have 24 hours water supply and, at the time, when the electricity was cut the water was also cut.”

“Some powerful people who had high positions within the authority did not pay the bills. Some people made illegal connections,” recalled Chan, adding that at that time 72 percent of the water was lost.

Now, the situation is different with consumers paying the full bills, and both soft and hard infrastructures in full place. Chan says PPWSA collects almost all the bills.“We have lost only seven percent, it is very minor. If we compare to other countries they have lost about 20 percent,” he noted.

Chan said PPWSA can produce 235,000 cubic meters daily that serve about 1.4 million people from 20,000 families in the city. He added that there are 160,000 connections across Phnom Penh and outskirts of the city, with the installed 1,500 kilometers water tubes within Phnom Penh .

Chan Samnang, one of the water consumers in Russei Keo district in Phnom Penh said PPWSA has given her a new life with an extreme change from 10 years ago during which she said her home had no running water.

“The situation has much improved from no running water to the tapped one with an affordable price,” Chan Samnang said. But, she added that despite PPWSA’s assurance to inform the public that the water is safe to drink, she is still not confident to drink water from the tap yet.

Ly Korm is also not confident to drink the tap water yet. But, Chan likes to assure his people that the water is safe to drink without boiling. “Any place you turn the tap, you can drink it right away,” he said, adding “I am drinking the tap water without boiling for already six years. I am safe.”

He issued a challenge to the citizens here: “If you get stomachache after drinking the tap water, I will pay you compensation” he said.

Chan believes that it is an economical imperative that drinkable water be available on taps to the poor. “Now, the poor communities drink water from the taps and they can save $5 per month from not buying fire wood,” he argues.

He said his authority had conducted experiments by testing water in 30 different places, and that the results filed by the authority’s laboratory, found no virus in the water.

Chan who is passionate about his work, says he was taken by surprise with the 2006 Ramon Magsaysay Award. “I did not know about the award until I checked it online. It makes me happy because my effort has been recognized,” he said.

Not only PPWSA is providing safe drinking water to a majority of the city’s poor, untypical for a public utility, it is even making a modest profit. Chan said last year the authority had made a profit of about $3.5 millions and this year it is expected to be $4 million.

“My business is growing. I am making higher and higher profits for the government,” boasted Chan, expressing confidence that with his plan by 2020, his authority can provide 100 percent of water coverage within the country’s capital of Phnom Penh and the suburbs.

Cambodia

Source: FAO-Forestry. Disclaimer.

Version: 1999

Geography and population

Cambodia is situated in southeast Asia on the coast of the Gulf of Thailand and has a total area of 181 040 km². It is bordered by Thailand in the west, Lao PDR in the north and Viet Nam in the east. These countries share the lower Mekong basin with Cambodia. Water surfaces, including Lake Tonle Sap, occupy approximately 2.2 percent of the total area of the country. The country is divided into 21 provinces for administrative purposes.

Physiographically, the coun-try comprises an undulating plateau in its eastern part, a continuous flat plain (the Lake Tonle Sap lowland) interrupted only by isolated hills (Phnoms) and the Mekong River in the central part of the country, and by the Cardamone mountains in the southwest of the country.

The cultivable area is estimated at 4.626 million ha, or 25 percent of the total area. The total cultivated area has been estimated by a recent remote sensing survey at 3 914 400 ha, or 21.6 percent of the total area, though this may be an overestimate. Indeed, there is a mosaic of about 1 million ha of crops and secondary vegetal formation or trees, where the area actually cropped and harvested does not exceed 150 000 ha. Moreover, many paddy fields with palm trees are considered as cultivated although they are not actually farmed every year. More realistic estimates give a total cultivated area of about 2.1 million ha for 1993, of which 1 844 000 ha of cultivated rice (1 685 000 ha harvested), 122 000 ha of other annual crops, and 146 000 ha of permanent crops (mainly palm trees, coconut and rubber).

The total population was estimated at 10.3 million in 1996 (79 percent rural). The population density is 57 inhabitants/km², varying from 4 inhabitants/km² in Mondul Kiri in the northeast to 236 inhabitants/km² in Kandal in the southeast. The population growth rate was 2.5 percent in 1994. About 73 percent of the active population is currently engaged in agriculture, and agriculture accounted for 45 percent of GDP in 1994.

Climate and water resources

Climate

Cambodia has a wet monsoon climate. The wet season starts in May and ends in October. The rainfall pattern is bi-modal with peaks in June and September/October.

In August, a short period of drought may damage wet season rice which is not irrigated. In Phnom Penh, the monthly rainfall ranges from 5 mm in January to 255 mm in October. The average annual rainfall is estimated at 1 463 mm but varies from about 1 000 mm in Svay Check in the western province of Banteay Meanchey to nearly 4 700 mm in Bokor in the southern province of Kampot. The mean annual evaporation varies from 1 000 to 2 300 mm/year. April is the warmest month of the year with a maximum temperature of 36°C, while January is the coldest with 21°C.

River basin: the Tonle Sap/Mekong system

Cambodia has a unique hydrological system. The Mekong River and Lake Tonle Sap are connected by the Tonle Sap River which twice a year reverses its direction of flow. From July to the end of October, when the level of the Mekong is high, water flows into the Tonle Sap River, which fills Lake Tonle Sap, thereby increasing the size of the lake from 2 600 km² to about 10 500 km² at its maximum. The storage capacity of Lake Tonle Sap is estimated at 72 km³. In early November, when the level of the Mekong decreases, the Tonle Sap River reverses its flow, and water flows from Lake Tonle Sap to the Mekong River and thence to the Mekong Delta.

About 86 percent of Cambodia's territory (156 000 km²) is included in the Mekong River basin, the remaining 14 percent draining directly towards the Gulf of Thailand. Cambodia was a member of the Mekong River Committee between 1957 and 1975. On 5 April 1995, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Viet Nam signed an agreement for the development of the Mekong River. Under the agreement, the Mekong River Committee became the Mekong River Commission.

The average annual discharge of the Mekong River entering Cambodia is estimated to be close to the discharge at Paksé (324.45 km³/year) in Lao PDR, some 120 km upstream from the border with Cambodia. Other inflows to the Mekong-Tonle Sap system from outside the country amount to 29.9 km³ from Viet Nam and 1.2 km³ from Thailand. On average, 471.4 km³/year flow out of the country in the Mekong channels and tributaries to Viet Nam.

The internal renewable surface water resources (IRSWR) have been computed as the difference between outflow and inflow, i.e. 115.9 km³. This figure does not include the unknown discharge of small rivers to the Gulf of Thailand and is thus probably an underestimate. Groundwater resources are estimated at 17.6 km³, most of which (an estimated 13 km³/year) is drained by the rivers and cannot be considered as additional water resources. The total renewable water resources of Cambodia are therefore estimated at 476.110 km³/year.

The quality of groundwater is generally satisfactory, although high iron concentrations and increased salinity levels have been encountered in some provinces (Svay Rieng, Prey Veng and Takeo).

Lakes and dams

The capacity of the existing dams is very low and has not been estimated. Only one small dam (Ochum, in the northeastern province of Ratanakiri) is used as a hydropower station with an installed capacity of 1 MW. The Kirirom power plant, which was installed in 1968 in Kompong Speu province with a capacity of 10 MW, has not been in operation since 1970 due to war damage. A number of dams with high storage capacity are planned for the near future.

Water withdrawal

Water withdrawal was estimated at 520 million m³ in 1987 (Figure 1), of which 94 percent for agricultural purposes.

The total population with access to water supply was estimated at 19 percent in 1992. At that time, it was estimated that only 7 000 wells had been constructed (by international organizations) out of the 30 000 needed.

A 1995 survey assessed the quality of water supply, wastewater and sanitation in the main towns of Cambodia. Most of the systems combined sewage and drainage water, and have not been maintained over the past two decades. As a result, they are now in a poor condition and not functioning properly. Drainage water often mixes with drinking water with obvious health implications; floods are frequent during the rainy season as the sewers clog rapidly. In Battambang, in the west of the country, about 13 000 people are served by a water sewage system. The average treated sewage flows are estimated at 157 000 m³/year.

Irrigation and drainage development

Cambodia's history of hydraulic control goes back to before the Angkor period (tenth century). The famous Angkor Wat irrigation system was based on four reservoirs, built between the tenth and thirteenth centuries, and stored some 100-150 million m^³ of water to irrigate approximately 14 000 ha.

Modern irrigation systems were first developed in the period 1950-53. Many of the structures built during that period functioned until 1975. Most of these structures, such as the 'colmatage' canals, have become non-functional as a result of the network of irrigation/drainage systems built during the period 1975-79. Since then, most attempts to rehabilitate these newer schemes have failed (Figure 2).

Irrigation potential has never been estimated in terms of physical area which could be irrigated considering water and land resources. However, an assessment has been made of the total potential cropped area if existing and past irrigation systems were rehabilitated and improved. The total area would be 419 344 ha in the wet season and 187 020 ha in the dry season.

Water managed areas were estimated to be 390 461 ha in 1993, of which 69 percent were equipped with full/partial control irrigation, and 31 percent were flood recession cropping areas (Figure 3).

Some 841 full/partial control irrigation schemes have been recorded in a recent inventory, covering a total area of 269 461 ha. Only 176 of these schemes were reported to be fully operational, while 115 schemes covering 27 638 ha were equipped but not operating.

The operating full/partial control irrigation schemes can be divided into four main categories (Figure 4):

• River, lake or stream diversion by gravity. These systems are used for wet season supplementary irrigation as there are no storage facilities. Offtakes are generally uncontrolled, although in some cases, water level control is provided by diversion weirs.
• Water pumping from rivers. These systems can provide water for both the wet and dry seasons. Pump stations have been provided by the Government.
• Reservoirs storing water from runoff, streams or rivers for wet season supplementary irrigation. Water is abstracted from the reservoir by gravity or mobile pumps provided by farmers.
• Reservoirs storing flood waters from the Tonle Sap/Bassac/Mekong system and released by gravity or mobile pumps for a dry season recession crop only. These areas also benefit from natural flooding for land preparation. The crop is transplanted as the floodwater recedes and irrigated during the growing season with water stored in nearby reservoirs. This system takes advantage of the large range of water levels in the Tonle Sap/Bassac/Mekong system to fill the reservoirs during the flood to a level sufficient to give gravity command of the paddy fields. Although they are equipped for full/partial control irrigation, these areas are often termed flood recession areas as they use natural flooding at the beginning of the season for land preparation and the filling of the reservoirs.

The cropped area in these full/partial control irrigation schemes is estimated at 172 727 ha during the wet season and 103 656 ha in the dry season. Double cropping is practised only on small areas (estimated at 6 922 ha).

Another classification, used by the Department of Hydrology, defines three irrigation systems (Figure 5):

• Large-scale projects, where water is supplied from a multipurpose dam (generally irrigation and hydropower). The annual irrigated area for these schemes is estimated at 118 225 ha in the wet season and 63 241 ha in the dry season.
• Medium-scale projects, with an irrigated area of 100 ha or more, where water is supplied by single-purpose dams or 'colmatage' canals. The 'colmatage' system uses dikes and sluices to provide controlled annual inundation. Intake and drainage are controlled, allowing a fertile layer of silt to settle on the fields. The annual irrigated area for these schemes is estimated at 46 599 ha in the wet season and 31 225 ha in the dry season.
• Small-scale projects, with an area of less than 100 ha. The annual irrigated area for these schemes is estimated at 7 903 ha in the wet season and 9 190 ha in the dry season.

There are about 121 000 ha of floating rice, mainly in the provinces bordering Lake Tonle Sap: Battambang, Banteay Meanchey, Pursat, Siem Reap, Kompong Thom and Kampong Cham. This general category consists of two subcategories:

• floating rice, with a straw length up to 4 m;
• deep water rice, with a straw length of 1-2 m.

Both subcategories are adapted to continuous, unregulated flooding. The rice varieties have a rapid elongation with increase in water depth, and submergence tolerance to flash floods. In this country profile, these 121 000 ha are considered as deep-water/flood recession cropping areas.

A recent survey has estimated that the development of one hectare irrigated by pumping would require an investment coast of US$2 800, and US$85/year for O&M, while the respective figures for a hectare irrigated from a reservoir would be US$3 600-4 300 and US$40-65/year.

The major crop in Cambodia is rice, with a total harvested area of 1.84 million ha in 1993. This figure comprises irrigated rice, floating rice, but also upland rice (about 24 000 ha in 1993) and rainfed rice which is cultivated in the lowland during the wet season and which covers most of the rice-cropped area in Cambodia. The average rice yield is estimated at 1.39 t/ha under rainfed conditions and 2.07 t/ha under irrigated conditions.

A recent FAO survey indicates that a number of areas appear suitable for groundwater exploitation, though there are still uncertainties about water quantity and quality. The lack of data, particularly on water quality, is a cause for concern as there are reports on iron toxicity from Svay Rieng province, close to the border with Viet Nam, as well as increased tidal saline incursion from the Mekong River in May-June.

Two of the most common water related diseases linked to the development of irrigation are malaria and schistosomiasis. Malaria is already a serious problem throughout the country as a consequence of the natural ecosystem. Estimates of about 500 000 cases of malaria per year are common. Each year, 5 000-10 000 persons die from malaria. Schistosomiasis was reported in the Kratie area in 1993. Dengue haemorrhagic fever has recently become an important cause of child morbidity in Cambodia. In 1990, about 7 000 cases resulting in 340 deaths were recorded.

Institutional environment

The public institutions involved in the water sector are:

• The General Directorate of Irrigation, Meteorology and Hydrology of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, with:
  -the Department of Water Management, which is responsible for the O&M of all irrigation infrastructure in Cambodia, including the operation and repair of pumps. The office also undertakes rural water supply, including well drilling;
  -the Department of Engineering, which is responsible for the design and construction of hydraulic structures;
  -the Department of Hydrology, which carries out the installation and maintenance of a network of hydrological stations, and collects and processes data;
  -the Department of Meteorology, which is in charge of meteorological data collection and forecasting;
  -the Department of Research, Training and Extension.
• The Mekong Secretariat: the River Mekong, whose lower basin covers large areas of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Viet Nam, is a major regional resource. In 1957, the Mekong River Committee was established under the auspices of the United Nations to coordinate the efforts of these countries in developing the resource. In principle, all proposals to utilize the waters of the Lower Mekong Basin require the unanimous approval of the country representatives on the now renamed Mekong River Commission.

An informal 'water resources law task force' has been established through the Irrigation Sector Meeting of the interested parties. As part of this process, an adviser to the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) has compiled a draft law on the water resources of Cambodia, which was due to be submitted in 1996.

Domestic water supply is the responsibility of several institutions: the Department of Hydrology, the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Rural Development.

Trends in water resources management

Under the National Socio-Economic Development Plan, 1996-2000, water supply and wastewater treatment have been set as priorities by the Government.

While precise comprehensive data on access to water supply are not available, it is estimated that some 1.75 million people (19 percent of the population) have access to clean drinking water. This is about 40 percent of the urban population and 15 percent of the rural population.

Similarly, precise comprehensive data on the provision of environmental sanitation are not available. Access to sanitation is limited to an estimated 1.24 million people (13 percent of the population); about 53 percent of the urban population (mostly in Phnom Penh) and 6 percent of the rural population.

It is estimated that providing a safe water supply to 65 percent of the rural population by 2000 would require a capital investment of nearly US$31 million, or an average of about US$6 million/year.

The target is to provide an additional 1.5 million rural people with access to environmental sanitation facilities in the period 1996-2000. This is based on a realistic assessment of the Government's absorptive capacity, its ability to implement programmes and the prospects for external funding to the sector. It would increase the coverage of rural sanitation from 6 percent to about 22 percent by 2000.

In the recent past, sedimentation of Lake Tonle Sap has given cause for concern. This concern is mainly due to the Mekong silt load, and to deforestation in the upper reaches of the Tonle Sap watershed. In the absence of reliable data on hydrology and sediments in this area, many scenarios have been developed. The most pessimistic ones forecast a drying up of the lake in a ten-year period, while other studies estimate that the lake would take 600 years to dry up. All these estimates reveal a need for reliable hydrological data. What is agreed by all concerned is the negative effect of sedimentation on the environment, particularly on fish.

As new irrigation scheme development has a low economic internal rate of return (1-6 percent), the rehabilitation of existing schemes has been set as a priority by the Government. Priority is given to small-scale schemes, as large-scale schemes have serious O&M problems. The estimated potential of irrigated agriculture production is high for small-scale irrigation schemes with active community participation and in combination with other agricultural technology packages, especially balanced fertilizer use. Indeed, soil fertility is a major problem in Cambodia and production increase with irrigation alone would remain relatively limited.

In the Mekong Delta, the development of groundwater irrigation might be a valid alternative to the present water managed systems (in certain areas with sufficient and easily accessible groundwater reserves) whose efficiency depends heavily on the level fluctuations of the Mekong River. Recently, sprinkler and micro-irrigation have been introduced on very small areas in Cambodia.

Another priority is the development of well-designed flood control devices in conjunction with irrigation facilities to enable drainage in times of flooding, and irrigation in the dry season. Another priority is the construction of several dams, mainly for hydropower purposes. Investigations have been carried out by the Mekong River Commission. Two of these dams (Sambor and Stung Treng), with a total estimated cost of US$11 907 million would have a power capacity of 4 208 MW. The environmental costs would include 31 700 ha of agricultural land and 75 300 ha of forests flooded, and more than 14 000 people having to be resettled.

Another project has been prepared for regulating the level of Lake Tonle Sap and for hydroelectricity generation (140 MW of capacity) at an estimated cost of US$435 million.

The Asian Development Bank is investigating the feasibility of building dams on the Stung Chinit (a tributary of the Tonle Sap River), and on the Se Kong and Se San rivers, both in the province of Ratanakiri in northeast Cambodia.

Main sources of information

Anonymous. 1965. Aperçu général sur le climat du Cambodge. Phnom Penh.

FAO & UNDP. 1994. Cambodia, land cover atlas (1985/1987-1992/1993), including national and provincial statistics prepared by the Mekong Secretariat for FAO/UNDP project CMB/92/005. Phnom Penh.

FAO. 1994. Agricultural development options review (phase I). Report prepared by the FAO Investment Centre. Rome

Mekong Secretariat. 1993. Development plan for the Tonle Sap and Chakdomuk (phase I), final report. Report prepared by ORSTOM in association with BCEOM. Phnom Penh.

Mekong Secretariat. 1994. Irrigation rehabilitation study in Cambodia, final report. Report prepared by Sir William Halcrow and Partners in association with Mandala Agricultural Development Corporation, Annex A, B and D. Phnom Penh.

Mekong Secretariat. 1995. Review and assessment of water resources for hydropower and identification of priority projects in Cambodia. Main Report by Chao Phraya Engineering Consortium and ACT Consultants. Phnom Penh.

Ministry of Environment. 1994. Cambodia, first state of the environment report. Prepared in association with the UNDP and other cooperating organizations. Phnom Penh.

People's Forum on Ecology. 1995. Report watershed. Volume 1, No. 1, July.

World Bank. 1995. Agricultural productivity improvement project, agricultural hydraulics component. Submitted by J. Himel, adviser.

World Bank. 1995. Cambodia: rehabilitation program: implementation and outlook. Washington, D.C.

message from Japanese PM Fukuda

It is time for the world to act. This is Yasuo Fukuda."
-- Message from the Prime Minister (Provisional Translation)


It is time for the world to act. This is Yasuo Fukuda.

"We estimate that already some 100 million people may have been
pushed into poverty... over the last two years."

World Bank Group President Robert B. Zoellick made this statement
when he was speaking about the influence of the recent worldwide
surge in grain prices. Indeed, during these two years corn, soybean,
and wheat prices have more than doubled.

In Japan, we are largely dependent on imports of food,
and accordingly, we have seen the price of bread, dairy products,
and other foods increase significantly. This is already exacting
a substantial toll on the lives of the people, though the issue
of food price increases is not only an issue for Japan.

Many of the nations of Asia and Africa rely on imported food.
In some of those nations, the average per capita income amounts
to less than one dollar per day, and more than half of that has to
be spent on purchasing food. The current sharp rise in food prices
is a serious issue directly affecting the very lives of poor people
who are struggling just to be able to afford to eat.

Moreover, in some nations we are seeing demonstrations and riots
by people who have had enough of rising prices, and in some cases
this has resulted in casualties and deaths. Last week, my sense
of the gravity of this issue was renewed when I held talks with
many leaders from Africa on the occasion of the Fourth Tokyo
International Conference on African Development (TICAD IV).

It was with this strong sense of urgency that I came to Rome
on June 3 to attend the World Food Summit.

More than anything else, we must absolutely get food as quickly as
possible to those people who at this very instant are experiencing
shortfalls of food and to those who are actually starving.
For our part, I have announced Japan's additional food assistance,
and moreover, called upon countries around the world to release
their stockpiles of food and to refrain from instituting
restrictions on agricultural exports.

As we look ahead, aiming for long-term stability, we must increase
food production capacity on a global scale. It goes without saying
that Japan, the world's largest food importer, must achieve greater
agricultural production and increase our food self-sufficiency rate.
In addition, I have announced that Japan, in close coordination
with the international community, will make an active contribution
to infrastructure development such as irrigation and research into
breed improvement, so as to improve the agricultural productivity
of African nations and other developing countries.

The production of biofuels utilizing grain products is also one
factor in the recent rapid price increases. As such, I made it
clear that Japan will accelerate research on biofuels made of
non-food plants as well as the portions of agricultural products
that are left over after harvest such as rice straw, in order to
bring them into practical production.

It is time for the world to take swift actions based upon collected
wisdom and insights.

Before and after attending the World Food Summit, I had
opportunities to meet with Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany,
Prime Minister Gordon Brown of the United Kingdom, President
Nicolas Sarkozy of France, and Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi
of Italy. In our talks, it became apparent to me that all of these
world leaders share this view on the current situation and consider
the food situation that the world is facing now to be of crisis
proportions.

Leaders of major industrialized nations will gather together
at the G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit next month.

As the Chair of the G8 Summit, I intend to place the issue
of the rapid increase in food prices firmly on the agenda.
I am resolved to issue to the world a robust message -- one that
represents the determination of the leaders of the G8 nations --
that will offer assurance for the future about food, the foundation
for life.

Japanese response to food crisis

Address by H.E. Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan
On the Occasion of the High-Level Conference on World Food Security: The Challenges of Climate Change and Bioenergy

Rome June 3, 2008
Japanese

Chair Prime Minister Berlusconi,
United Nations Secretary-General Mr. Ban Ki-moon,
Distinguished participants,

I would like to begin my remarks today by extending my gratitude to Dr. Jacques Diouf, Director General of the FAO, for his initiative in convening this High-Level Conference to address the current serious sharp rise in food prices.

In 1968, a think tank was formed here in Rome gathering the wisdom of wise men from all over the world who accepted the call of Dr. Aurelio Peccei, an Italian. This think tank was to be known as the "Club of Rome."

Four years later, in 1972, the Club of Rome released a report titled "The Limits to Growth" which gave a warning on exhaustion of resources and destruction of environment. This report caused a sensation when it was released. However, not many of us at the time took this prophecy seriously. As a result, we continued our dependence on fossil fuels without reflecting upon our lifestyle of mass production, mass consumption, and mass waste, thereby steadily increasing the emission of greenhouse gases.

Thirty years have passed since the Club of Rome issued the report. We are finally hearing the scream of the earth. Today, we gather here to solve together the global challenge.

As all of you gathering here are aware, the fundamentals of supply-demand balance of food are gradually becoming more and more unstable. Cultivatable land barely increases anywhere in the world, the climate change continues to develop, and conversion of food for energy use is increasing; nevertheless, the world population is continuing its growth. It is estimated that over 100 million people are newly at risk of hunger as a result of this threat, and we find ourselves confronting the possibility that our efforts thus far to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) may be hindered.

Last week, I chaired the Fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development, or "TICAD IV," where I exchanged views with 40 African leaders and was reminded of the gravity of this issue. Therefore, I am attending this Conference with the strong sense of urgency.

Basic Thinking

Mr. Chair,

The question is what we should do in light of this situation.

In brief, we must share a common recognition of the gravity of the situation, thoroughly analyze its causes, and undertake fully in concert comprehensive and coherent measures ranging from emergency responses to medium- and long-term efforts.

We must take actions based upon collected wisdom and insights.

Therefore, I consider the "Comprehensive Framework for Action" introduced today by Secretary-General Ban to be an extremely important foundation for our efforts. I would like to extend my appreciation to Secretary-General Ban for his prompt response to this issue.

Emergency and short-term response measures to this crisis

First and foremost, we must extend the hand of assistance to people who are, at this very moment, suffering from food insecurity or hunger, as there is simply no time to lose.

It was from this perspective that Japan announced an emergency food aid package of roughly 100 million US dollars to be disbursed by July of this year, to add to the approximately 85 million dollars of food aid Japan has already distributed within 2008. Furthermore, Japan has also provided 10 million dollars of assistance this year to farmers in poverty to boost food production, and we will distribute another roughly 50 million dollars at the earliest possible time.

We must urgently secure social safety nets for people who have newly fallen into hunger and measures to support crop planting for this year and the next. Japan intends to make further active contributions in this area under the coordinated international framework, including partnership with the Global Food Crisis Response Program recently announced by The World Bank.

There have been difficulties in procuring rice in the international markets as a result of recent price rises. Japan is prepared to release in the near future over 300 thousand tons of imported rice held by the Japanese government. I would like to call on other countries to release to the international markets their stockpiles of food, to return some degree of equilibrium to the food market, which has been heating up recently.

If it should be that the current food market situation has resulted from market speculation or other factors un-related to real demand, it is imperative that we demonstrate strong political will to monitor these factors. Furthermore, we must consider the creation of some sort of mechanism to secure this political will.

In addition, Japan would like to call upon countries to refrain from instituting restrictions on agricultural exports and other measures.

At the WTO negotiating table, Japan proposed a scheme through which food importing countries would be able to assert their views upon the imposition of export restrictions. This too aims at the improvement of the environment which is necessary for smooth trade in agricultural products. We look forward to the support of the international community toward this proposal.

Medium- to long-term measures

If we are to resolve the issue of soaring food prices fundamentally, each country must maximize the use of its own potential resources and achieve greater agricultural production. Japan, as the world's largest net food importer, will engage in all possible efforts to contribute to stabilization of demand and supply of food in the world market through promotion of domestic agricultural reform and increasing our food self-sufficiency rate.

Improving agricultural productivity and the production capacity of African nations and other developing countries is also an urgent task. Japan has been proactively engaged in these areas, providing roughly 30% of DAC countries' total amount of assistance to agricultural, forestry, and fisheries sectors over the past five years to rank as the top provider of assistance in these fields. The international community must re-engage in the agricultural sector and endeavor to increase the amount of assistance it provides.

At TICAD IV that convened last week, I called for a doubling, over the next ten years, of Africa's output of rice, of which consumption is surging. Under the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme, which is Africa's own undertaking aiming at increasing agricultural productivity, Japan will, in cooperation with relevant countries and organizations, actively promote the infrastructure development such as irrigation, research into breed improvement, and human resource development to disseminate cultivation techniques and other measures.

Mr. Chair,

With regard to the soaring food prices as we are currently confronting, new factors not seen in food crises of the past, have been pointed out, such as linkages to the rising fuel prices, climate change, and relations with financial markets and energy markets. Therefore, our responses must be comprehensive and multi-faceted. Here I would like to mention just two points.

First, we must earnestly engage ourselves in measures for the mitigation of global warming. At the same time, measures are needed to enable the agricultural sector of developing countries to adapt to the impact of climate change.

At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland in January, I announced a new financial mechanism on the scale of 10 billion US dollars to promote the "Cool Earth Partnership" in order to assist developing countries.

Secondly, we need to ensure that biofuel production is sustainable by carrying out such undertakings as to accelerate research on second-generation biofuels, which do not require food crops as feedstock, in order to bring them into practical production, so that global food security does not suffer on account of biofuel production. Japan will actively engage in such undertakings as well.

Toward the G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit

Mr. Chair,

At the G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit to be held next month, taking into account the discussions and outputs of this High-Level Conference, we will undertake full-fledged discussions on markets, trade, development, climate change, and energy, which are indeed the combined factors underlying soaring food prices, and then translate that into action. I am determined to issue collectively a robust message that will offer assurance and confidence for the future about food, which is the foundation for life and closely related to human security.

Thank you for your kind attention.

sources for researcher

http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/TLCPhD/authoringAPhDResources.htm

Literatures on Cambodia from Prof. Sophal Ear

"Political Economy of HPAI in Cambodia: Research Proposal", [PDF Acrobat File] Avian Influenza: The Politics and Policy Processes of a Global Response, STEPS Centre, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton, BN1 9RE, United Kingdom, April 25, 2008.

"Cambodia: Fragile Hopes After the Killing Fields", [PDF Acrobat File] Justice and Human Rights in Cambodia Lecture, Whitley Auditorium, Elon University, Elon, NC, 7:30pm, April 1, 2008.

"Justice, Forgiveness, and the Khmer Rouge Trials", [PDF Acrobat File] From Auschwitz to Darfur: The Genocide Convention at Sixty, A Legal Symposium Marking the 60th Anniversary of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Chapman University School of Law, Center for Global Trade & Development, Orange, CA, March 13, 2008.

"Discussion Brief/Points on the Politics of Binding Constraints to Growth in Cambodia", [PDF Acrobat File] Workshop on the Political-Economy of Binding Constraints to Growth in Cambodia, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, February 25, 2008.

"From 'Warship' to 'Peace Vessel': Essex in Cambodia (26 Nov-2 Dec 07)", [PDF Acrobat File] Navy 2008 Stability and Security Conference, Marriot Crystal Gateway Hotel, Crystal City, VA, January 30-31, 2008.

"Cambodian, Hmong, Lao and Vietnamese-Americans in the 2005 American Community Survey: A Social Science and Policy Perspective", Journal of Southeast Asian American Education & Advancement, Vol. 3, Issue 1, an official publication of the National Association for the Education and Advancement of Cambodian, Laotian, and Vietnamese Americans (NAFEA), with support from the Department of Bicultural-Bilingual Studies and the College of Education and Human Development at the University of Texas, San Antonio, forthcoming 2008.

"Trade and Commerce in Southeast Asia" and "Education in Colonial Southeast Asia" Entries (with Pierre van der Eng, Australia National University and Christine Inglis, University of Sydney, respectively), World History Encyclopedia edited by Jim Overfield (University of Vermont), ABC-Clio, forthcoming 2009.

"Does Aid Dependence Worsen Governance?", International Public Management Journal, Volume 10, Issue 3, September 2007, the refereed journal of the International Public Management Network. An earlier draft was presented in the Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California (October 25, 2006); the Department of Political Science and International Studies, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea (November 21, 2006); the International Conference on Social Science Research, Vancouver, Canada (December 10-12, 2006); the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ottawa, Canada (December 13, 2006), and the Department of Public Administration, Maxwell School of Syracuse University (February 1, 2007). E-mail if you'd like a FREE copy of the article.

"The Political Economy of Aid and Governance in Cambodia", Asian Journal of Political Science, Volume 15, Issue 1, April 2007, a refereed journal of the Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore. E-mail if you'd like a FREE copy of the article.

"Khmer Rouge", "Kampuchea", and "Pol Pot" Entries (with Susan Ear, UC Berkeley), World Fascism: A Historical Encyclopedia edited by Cyprian P. Blamires (University of Oxford), ABC-Clio, 2006.

"Human Rights & Freedom of Expression Events: Learning from Experience" [PDF Acrobat File of PowerPoint Presentation] Research Paper Presentation, Pact Cambodia, Phnom Penh, May 5, 2006. The complete paper, entitled "Change and Continuity in Cambodian Human Rights and Freedom of Expression: Learning from Experience" is available here [but be forewarned, it's a 279 page, 3.8 megabyte PDF Acrobat File].

The Political Economy of Aid, Governance, and Policy-Making: Cambodia in Global, National, and Sectoral Perspectives, [1.8 megabyte PDF Acrobat File] Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, filed April 19, 2006. The "official" University copy, with an abstract and 24 page preview (stored by ProQuest Information and Learning Company) is available for purchase here, but why pay money?

"The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Livestock Policy in Cambodia," [PDF Acrobat File] Working Paper 26, Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, August 2005. A Policy Brief version of the paper (for those who don't have time to read all 66 of its pages) was published at the same time and is available here. Those who have even less time can glance at the abstract!

"Governance and Economic Performance: Credibility, Political Will, and Reform," [PDF Acrobat File] Cambodian Economic Review, Cambodian Economic Association, May 2005.

"One Way Out," (with Cam Youk Lim) [PDF Acrobat File] The New York Times, Section 6; Column 1; Magazine Desk; LIVES; Pg. 134, April 17, 2005. Reprinted in The Cambodia Daily, April 19, 2005.

"Can Aid Both Help and Hinder Governance?" [PDF Acrobat File of PowerPoint Presentation] Paper Presentation Seminar, Asian Development Bank Headquarters, Manila, Philippines, November 9, 2004.

"Towards Understanding Social Protection in Cambodia," (with Sophal Chan) [PDF Acrobat File], Cambodia Development Review, Vol. 8, Issue 4, Cambodia Development Resource Institute, October-December 2004. Presented [PDF Acrobat File of PowerPoint Presentation] at the 7th Socio-Cultural Research Congress on Cambodia, Royal University of Phnom Penh, 16 November 2004, and reprinted in Congress Proceedings. Full report commissioned by the World Bank was presented (with Sophal Chan) as "Cambodia: Expenditure Analysis and Stocktaking of Social Protection" at the Dialogue on Social Protection, Phnom Penh, July 19-20, 2004.

"Language As Freedom / My Language Is My Passport," Survivor Stories, Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2004.

"Op-Ed Avoids Real Problem," The Daily Californian, Letter to the Editor, Friday, September 26, 2003.

"A man with no enemies," (with Dr. Peter Li) The Phnom Penh Post, Letter to the Editor, Issue 12/06, March 14-27, 2003.

"Cambodia" Entry, Encyclopedia of World Terrorism: 1996-2002, edited by Frank G. Shanty and Raymond Picquet, ISBN 1563248077, M.E. Sharpe, Inc. (Sharpe Reference), February 2003. Don't pay full price though, just click here.

"Analysis of the Results-Oriented Workshop on the Roles and Functions of International Advisors: Towards a Capacity Building Strategy and Action Plan for Timor-Leste" (with Toshi Nakamura) [PDF Acrobat File of PowerPoint Presentation], United Nations Development Programme, Dili, East Timor, December 11, 2002. Click here for the full report.

"How Does Spousal Education Matter? Some Evidence From Cambodia" (with Tomoki Fujii) [PDF Acrobat File], Asian Development Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, November 2002, a refereed journal of the Asian Development Bank. Presented draft of the paper [PDF Acrobat File of PowerPoint Presentation with Tomoki Fujii] on August 23, 2002 at a special Research Forum session held at the Cambodia Development Resource Institute, Phnom Penh. An earlier draft was also presented as a poster, International Symposium: "Sustaining Food Security and Managing Natural Resources in Southeast Asia: Challenges for the 21st Century". Organized by the University of Hohenheim, Chiang Mai University, and Kasetsart University (Thailand). Funded by the Eiselen Foundation (Germany). Royal Orchid Hotel, Chiang Mai, Thailand, January 8-11, 2002.

"Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World," [PDF Acrobat File of PowerPoint Presentation], United Nations Development Programme Global Launch, Hotel Le Royal, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, July 24, 2002.

"Has More Aid Worsened Governance Since 1995? A Large-N Study of Six Quality of Governance Indicators" [PDF Acrobat File], M.A. Essay, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, May 6, 2002.

"Change and Continuity in the Political Economy of Cambodia: Before and After the Commune Elections" [PDF Acrobat File of PowerPoint Presentation], presented at the quarterly meeting of Khmer United, a community-based organization. SeaPort Marina Hotel, Long Beach, California, April 27-28, 2002.

"Tobacco, Poverty, and Socioeconomic Status in Cambodia" [PDF Acrobat File], One-Page Research Prospectus and PowerPoint [PDF Acrobat File of PowerPoint Presentation], presented at the "Tobacco Control Research Workshop". Organized by the Southeast Asia Tobacco Control Alliance, the Johns Hopkins University and the University of Illinois at Chicago. Supported by the Rockefeller Foundation. Felix Kwai River Resort Hotel, Kanchanaburi, Thailand, March 25-29, 2002.

"Cambodia and the U.N." [PDF Acrobat File], The New York Times, [Letter to the Editor Section] February 21, 2002.

Reducing Vulnerability and Increasing Opportunity: Social Protection in the Middle East and North Africa [Contributed inputs and comments], The World Bank, Report No. 24560, January 1, 2002.

"Transparency Through Government Initiatives: From the 'Washington Consensus' to the African Experience" and "Role and Agenda of the Private Sector" [Both PDF Acrobat Files of PowerPoint Presentations], International Conference "Building a Coalition for Transparency". Co-organized by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Center for Social Development (CSD). Sponsored by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Partnership for Transparency Fund (PTF), and USAID through the Asia Foundation. Hotel Inter-Continental, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, August 22-23, 2001.

"Cambodia and the 'Washington Consensus' Revisited, Following the Twin Crises" [PDF Acrobat File of PowerPoint Presentation], Asian Development Bank Seminar, ADB Headquarters, Manila, the Philippines, August 15, 2001.

"Cambodia and the 'Washington Consensus' Redux" [PDF Acrobat File of PowerPoint Presentation], Southeast Asian Studies Summer Institute (SEASSI) Conference: "Southeast Asia in the Wake of the Crisis: Democratization, Nationalism and Responses to Globalization". University of Wisconsin at Madison, June 22-23, 2001.

"Romanticizing the Khmer Revolution" [PDF Acrobat File in Khmer], The Truth, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Issue 17, May 2001. Original English-Language Draft [PDF Acrobat File]

Morocco: Poverty Update [Contributed to Labor Markets with Guillermo Hakim], The World Bank, Report No. 21506-MOR, March 30, 2001.

"The World Bank and Cambodia: Everything You Ever Wanted to Know... But Were Afraid to Ask" [PDF Acrobat File of PowerPoint Presentation], Cambodian Development Colloquium, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, September 23, 2000.

"Forestry Deja Vu" [Letter to the Editor], Phnom Penh Post, Issue 9/11, May 26-June 8, 2000.

Cambodia: Poverty Assessment [Contributed to Post-Conflict and Rural Development], The World Bank, Report No. 19858-KH, November 22, 1999.

"UC Berkeley Will Lose Out," The Daily Californian, Letter to the Editor, Thursday, November 4, 1999.

"Why Cambodia is No Basket Case," Pacific News Service, January 29, 1999. Reprinted in JINN Magazine, Issue No. 5.02, 01/18/99-01/31/99. Reprinted by South Africa's new media company, WOZA Internet (Pty) Ltd., February 1, 1999. Reprinted as "The Other Cambodia: Signs of Hope Remain Largely Overlooked" in AsianWeek, February 11, 1999.

"Cambodia and the Washington Consensus," [PDF Acrobat File] Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, refereed by the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University, Volume 11, Number 2, 1997. Reprinted as Chapter 22 in Peou, Sorpong, ed. Cambodia: Change and Continuity in Contemporary Politics, Ashgate Press, UK, 2001.

"How the Asian Crisis Will Impact Cambodia," The CICP Newsletter, Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Issue No. 23, January-February 1998. Based on an interview with Radio Free Asia in January 1998 that was broadcast February 3, 1998.

"A Currency Board for Cambodia," Les Cahiers du Ceria, série rouge, Center for Asian Interdisciplinary Studies and Research, n°2, juillet 1997.

"Cambodia: Negotiating the Peace Accords," Les Cahiers du Ceria, série rouge, Center for Asian Interdisciplinary Studies and Research, n°1, juin 1997.

"Editorial: Peace and Democracy at Risk in Cambodia," Pacific Asia Review, Princeton University, Vol. 3, No. 4, April 1997.

"Observation: Competition, Bargaining, Information, and Price Discrimination in Cambodia's Psah," The CICP Newsletter, Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Issues No. 15 & 16, June-July 1996.

"Dollarization, Monetary Independence and Inflation," The CICP Newsletter, Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Issues No. 15 & 16, June-July 1996.

"The Internet Comes to Cambodia," The CICP Newsletter, Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, No. 14, May 1996.

"The Khmer Rouge Canon," Khmer Conscience, Vol. IX, No. 1, Winter 1995.

"Excerpts: Cambodia's Economic Development and History," Khmer Conscience, Vol. IX, No. 1, Winter 1995.

"One Side of the Two-Sided Switch: Benedict Kiernan and the Khmer Rouge," Khmer Conscience, Vol. IX, No. 1, Winter 1995.

Cambodia's Economic Development in Historical Perspective. [PDF Acrobat File] Ronald E. McNair Research Paper, UC Berkeley, August 1995. Presented at the Ronald E. McNair Scholar Symposium at UC Berkeley, August 11, 1995.

"Cambodia's Economic Development in Historical Perspective (1953-1970)," Berkeley McNair Journal, UC Berkeley, Volume 3, Summer 1995.

The Khmer Rouge Canon 1975-1979: The Standard Total Academic View on Cambodia. [PDF Acrobat File] Undergraduate Honors Thesis in Political Science, Department of Political Science, UC Berkeley, May 1995. HTML File

Cambodia's Economic Development and History: A Contribution to the Study of the Cambodian Economy. Undergraduate Honors Thesis in Economics, Department of Economics, UC Berkeley, March 22, 1995.

"Are We Ready for Democracy?" Khmer Conscience, Vol. V, No. 1, Winter 1991. Reprinted in Nguoi Viet [Vietnamese People] Weekly, Vol. 13, No. 2101, May 23, 1991.